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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael James Wilson appeals from the order of the district court denying his
motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. On appeal,
Wilson argues that a sentence for both aggravated assault and a firearm enhancement
violates constitutional protections against double jeopardy.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Wilson and his accomplice kicked open Christopher Perini’s apartment door.
(41883 1 R., pp. 13-14, 31-33.) The door struck Mr. Perini’s girlfriend, Astahna Holt, on
her forehead, cutting it open. (Id.) Wilson then pointed his gun at Mr. Perini and said
“are you ready for this mother fucker.” (Id.) As Wilson pulled the trigger, Ms. Holt
deflected the pistol, and Wilson’s shot missed. (Id.) Wilson and his accomplice then
fled. (Id.)
The state charged Wilson with attempted murder in the first degree, assault with
intent to commit a serious felony, burglary and a firearm enhancement. (41883 R., pp.
90-92, 204-206, 256-258). The state dismissed Count II – assault with intent to commit a
serious felony. (41883 R., pp. 252-255.) The jury found Wilson not guilty of attempted
murder, but guilty of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault and guilty of

1

The Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion to augment this appeal with the record
from Wilson’s prior appeal in State v. Wilson, No. 41883. Citations to the prior record
on appeal are labeled “41883 R.”.
1

burglary. (41883 R., pp. 259-261.) The jury also found that Wilson used a firearm when
he committed both crimes. (Id.)
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Wilson to twelve years with
four years fixed for aggravated assault and the firearm enhancement. (41883 R., pp. 313316.) For burglary, the district court sentenced Wilson to three years with one year fixed.
(Id.) The district court ordered the two sentences to run consecutively. (Id.) Wilson
timely appealed. (41883 R., pp. 319-320.) Wilson moved the district court to reduce his
sentence (R., pp. 12-25.) The district court denied his motion. (R., pp. 26-27.)
On his initial appeal, Wilson contended that his sentences were excessive. See
State v. Wilson, No. 41883, 2015 WL 1741954, at *1 (Idaho App., Apr. 15, 2015). The
Idaho Court of Appeals determined the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
sentenced Wilson and affirmed Wilson’s judgment of conviction and sentences. See id.
Wilson filed a pro se motion for correction or reduction of sentence pursuant to
I.C.R. 35 arguing that his sentence was illegal because it violated double jeopardy. (R.,
pp. 32-42.) The district court denied the motion. (R., pp. 43-47.) The district court
found the motion was untimely because it was not filed within the 120 days as required
by I.C.R. 35(b). (Id.) The district court also denied the motion because Wilson’s double
jeopardy argument had already been considered and rejected by Idaho appellate courts.
(See R., p. 45 (citing State v. Metzgar, 109 Idaho 732, 734-735, 710 P.2d 642, 644-645
(Ct. App. 1985).) Wilson timely appealed. (R., pp. 51-54.)

2

ISSUE
Wilson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Wilson’s Rule 35 motion to
correct an illegal sentence because his motion was timely and because applying
the weapons enhancement statute to Mr. Wilson’s aggravated assault conviction
violated the double jeopardy clause of the Idaho Constitution?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Wilson failed to show the district court erred when it denied his Rule 35
motion?

3

ARGUMENT
Wilson Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied His
I.C.R. 35 Motion
A.

Introduction
The jury found Wilson guilty of aggravated assault, and burglary and also found

that Wilson used a firearm when he committed both crimes. (41883 R., pp. 259-261.)
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Wilson to twelve years with four years
fixed for aggravated assault and the firearm enhancement under Idaho Code § 19-2520.
(41883 R., pp. 313-316.) Wilson argued that this sentence was illegal because a sentence
for both the firearm enhancement and aggravated assault was double punishment and
violated double jeopardy. (See R., pp. 32-42.) The district court denied the motion both
as untimely and on its merits. (See R., pp. 43-46.) On appeal, Wilson argues that the
motion was timely and asks this Court adopt Montana case law to find Wilson’s sentence
violated double jeopardy.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-7.)

While the state agrees

Wilson’s Rule 35 motion was timely to the extent it alleged his sentence is illegal,
Wilson’s double jeopardy argument is without merit.
Idaho cases have repeatedly found that Idaho’s firearm enhancement statute does
not violate double jeopardy.

The underlying offense and the enhancement are not

separate offenses but instead the firearm enhancement provides only for the imposition of
additional punishment upon conviction of an offense in which a firearm was used. The
district court did not err.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law, given free review. State v.

Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 485, 272 P.3d 417, 457 (2012).

C.

The District Court Correctly Denied The I.C.R. 35 Motion Because Wilson’s
Sentence Was Not Illegal And Did Not Violate Double Jeopardy
1.

To The Extent Wilson’s Motion Challenged The Legality Of His Sentence,
The Motion Was Timely Filed

Approximately three years after the district court entered judgment, Wilson filed a
pro se Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence under I.C.R. 35 arguing that his
sentence was illegal. (R., pp. 32-42.) Wilson argued that his sentence violated his right
to be free from double jeopardy because he was sentenced both for the crime of
aggravated assault and for a firearm enhancement. (See id.) The district court denied the
motion both on the merits and because it was not filed within 120 days from the entry of
judgment. (See R., pp. 43-47.) On appeal, Wilson contends the district court erred in
dismissing his motion on timeliness grounds because, under I.C.R. 35(a), a court may
correct an illegal sentence at any time. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 states, in relevant part:
(a) Illegal Sentences. The court may correct a sentence that is illegal
from the face of the record at any time.
(b) Sentences Imposed in an Illegal Manner or Reduction of Sentence.
Within 120 days of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order
releasing retained jurisdiction, a motion may be filed to correct or reduce a
sentence and the court may correct or reduce the sentence. The court may
also reduce a sentence on revocation of probation or on motion made
within 14 days after the filing of the order revoking probation. Motions are
considered and determined by the court without additional testimony and
without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered. A defendant may only
file one motion seeking a reduction of sentence.
5

I.C.R. 35.
Wilson’s pro se Rule 35 motion appears to argue both that his sentence was
illegal and also possibly imposed in an illegal manner. (See R., pp. 32-42.) Thus, to the
extent his motion raises arguments regarding whether his sentence was imposed in an
illegal manner those grounds were untimely pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b). However, to the
extent his motion raised grounds that his sentence was illegal on its face, those claims can
be brought at any time pursuant to I.C.R. 35(a). See State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,
658-659, 978 P.2d 214, 218-219 (1999). Thus, it is likely that his pure double jeopardy
claim, regarding the legality of his sentence, was timely brought. However, even to the
extent his double jeopardy claim was timely raised, the district court properly denied it on
the merits.

2.

Wilson’s Sentence Was Not Illegal Because Idaho Law Holds That A
Firearm Enhancement Does Not Violate Double Jeopardy

Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) is a narrow rule that allows a trial court to correct an
illegal sentence at any time. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145
(2009). In Clements, the Idaho Supreme Court held that “the interpretation of ‘illegal
sentence’ under Rule 35 is limited to sentences that are illegal from the face of the record,
i.e., those sentences that do not involve significant questions of fact nor an evidentiary
hearing to determine their illegality.” Id. at 87, 218 P.3d at 1148. An illegal sentence
under Rule 35 is one in excess of a statutory provision or otherwise contrary to applicable
law. State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 745, 69 P.3d 153, 165 (Ct. App. 2003).
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 cannot be used as the procedural mechanism to attack the
validity of the underlying conviction. State v. McDonald, 130 Idaho 963, 965, 950 P.2d
6

1302, 1304 (Ct. App. 1997).

“[U]nder Rule 35, a trial court cannot examine the

underlying facts of a crime to which a defendant pled guilty to determine if the sentence
is illegal.” State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 65, 343 P.3d 497, 507 (2015) (citations
omitted). “Moreover, Rule 35’s purpose is to allow courts to correct illegal sentences,
not to reexamine errors occurring at trial or before the imposition of the sentence.” Id.
(emphasis original).
The jury found Wilson guilty of aggravated assault and burglary. (41883 R., pp.
259-261.) The jury also found that Wilson used a firearm when he committed both
crimes. (Id.) The district court entered judgment and sentenced Wilson to twelve years
with four years fixed for aggravated assault and the firearm enhancement under Idaho
Code § 19-2520. (41883 R., pp. 313-316.) For burglary, the district court sentenced
Wilson to three years with one year fixed. (Id.) The district ordered the two sentences to
run consecutively. (Id.) These sentences are within the maximum penalty proscribed by
law for these offenses and Wilson does not contend otherwise. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp. 4-7.) Instead, Wilson contends that the sentence is illegal on its face because both the
firearm enhancement and the aggravated assault charge punished him for the use of a
weapon and, thus, the sentence violates the protections against double jeopardy. (See id.)
Wilson’s argument is without merit and has already been rejected by Idaho’s appellate
courts.
The firearm enhancement, Idaho Code § 19-2520, states, in relevant part:
19-2520. Extended sentence for use of firearm or deadly weapon.
Any person convicted of a violation of sections 18-905 (aggravated
assault defined), ... 18-1401 (burglary defined), ... Idaho Code, who
displayed, used, threatened, or attempted to use a firearm or other deadly
7

weapon while committing or attempting to commit the crime, shall be
sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment. The extended term of
imprisonment authorized in this section shall be computed by increasing
the maximum sentence authorized for the crime for which the person was
convicted by fifteen (15) years.
...
The additional terms provided in this section shall not be imposed
unless the fact of displaying, using, threatening, or attempting to use a
firearm or other deadly weapon while committing the crime is separately
charged in the information or indictment and admitted by the accused or
found to be true by the trier of fact at the trial of the substantive crime.
This section shall apply even in those cases where the use of a
firearm is an element of the offense.
I.C. § 19-2520.
“The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions both
provide that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. They afford a
defendant three basic protections: protection against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and
multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.” State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658,
330 P.3d 400, 404 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994);
State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 622, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2001)). Wilson
argues that his sentence for aggravated assault with the firearm enhancement constitutes
multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-7.)
Contrary to Wilson’s argument, “I.C. § 19-2520 [the firearm enhancement] does
not prescribe a new offense but provides only for the imposition of additional punishment
upon conviction of an offense in which a firearm was used.” State v. Smith, 103 Idaho
135, 137, 645 P.2d 369, 371 (1982) (citations omitted). Further, “sentence imposed
under I.C. § 19-2520 does not create double jeopardy problems.” Id. (citations omitted).
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Wilson argues that Smith is distinguishable because “[u]nlike Mr. Wilson’s
aggravated assault conviction, ... the robbery charge in Smith did not include the use of a
weapon as an element.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) Wilson’s attempt to distinguish Smith
fails. The double jeopardy holding of Smith does not depend on an analysis of the
elements of the substantive and the weapons enhancement. See Smith, 103 Idaho at 137,
645 P.3d at 371. The elements are irrelevant for a double jeopardy analysis because the
firearm enhancement is not a separate crime. See id. The firearm enhancement only
increases the penalty for the offense when the defendant uses a firearm in the commission
of the offense. See id. Smith is controlling.
Nor is the holding in Smith an isolated holding. Other Idaho cases are in accord.
“Our Supreme Court has noted that I.C. § 19–2520 does not define or create a separate
offense, but is merely a sentence enhancing statute that comes into play after a defendant
is convicted of one of the enumerated offenses.” State v. Galaviz, 104 Idaho 328, 329–
30, 658 P.2d 999, 1000–01 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing State v. Cardona, 102 Idaho 668, 670,
637 P.2d 1164, 1166 (1981)).

It does not create double jeopardy problems simply

because the legislature decided to use two statutes to define the penalty for an offense
committed with a firearm. See State v. Metzgar, 109 Idaho 732, 734-735, 710 P.2d 642,
644-645 (1985); see
also ------------State v. Hernandez, 120 Idaho 653, 659, 818 P.2d 768, 774 (Ct.
- --App. 1991) (“This Court has ruled that a sentence imposed for conviction of a crime, then
enhanced for the use of a firearm during the crime, does not violate a defendant’s right to
be free from double jeopardy.”).
Further, in Metzgar the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected a nearly identical
argument to the one here made by Wilson. See Metzgar, 109 Idaho at 734-735, 710 P.2d
9

at 644-645.

A jury found Metzgar guilty of aggravated assault with a firearm

enhancement because he used a firearm in the commission of the offense. See id. at 732734, 710 P.2d at 642-643. On appeal Metzgar argued “that since the aggravated assault
involved a firearm, the enhancement of his sentence for using a firearm violated his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.” Id. at 734, 710 P.2d at 643. The Idaho
Court of Appeals noted “that the double jeopardy clause only prevents the sentencing
court from prescribing a sentence greater than what the legislature intended.” Id. at 734735, 710 P.2d at 644-645 (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-369 (1983)). The
Court concluded that the “Idaho legislature had intended that certain crimes, when
committed with a firearm, should receive greater penalties than if no firearm had been
used.” Id. (citing Galaviz, 104 Idaho 328, 658 P.2d 999). Thus, the fact that the
legislature enacted two statutes to set the penalty does not violate double jeopardy. See
id.
The rationale the courts generally have adopted, in upholding enhanced
penalty statutes, is that the statutes do not provide for multiple penalties
but rather provide for a single more severe penalty when an offense is
committed with a deadly weapon.
Galaviz, 104 Idaho at 330, 658 P.2d at 1001. Thus, like in Metzgar, Wilson’s sentence
for aggravated assault with a weapons enhancement does not violate double jeopardy.
Wilson also argues that the Idaho cases were wrongly decided and instead this
Court should rely upon a Montana case. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7 (citing State v.
Guillaume, 293 Mont. 224, 975 P.2d 312 (Mont. 1999)). The Montana court held that the
Fifth Amendment does not bar such a punishment regime, but construed the Montana
Constitution to provide broader protections and on that basis granted the defendant relief.
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See Guillaume, 975 P.2d at 317. Guillaume is plainly irrelevant to Idaho’s constitution
and Idaho’s double jeopardy protections. Further, there is no need to examine foreign
case law when there are multiple controlling Idaho cases, none of which Wilson has
shown should be overturned. “When there is controlling precedent on questions of Idaho
law ‘the rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong,
unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary
to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.’” State v.
Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 287, 297 P.3d 244, 250 (2013) (citing Greenough v. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592, 130 P.3d 1127, 1130 (2006); Houghland
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)). Idaho case law, as
cited above, has repeatedly held that use of the firearm enhancement under Idaho Code
§ 19-2520 does not violate double jeopardy. The district court did not err when it denied
Wilson’s motion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the decision of the district court.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of January, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
MAYA P. WALDRON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson__________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
TST/dd
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